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1. Introduction 
 
Risk and time preferences are important factors in economic decision-making, particularly among farmers 
in developing countries (Binswanger, 1980, Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009, Galarza, 2009). For instance, risk 
aversion has been shown to restrict farmers’ willingness to participate in risky but potentially profitable 
activities such as money lending (Boucher et al., 2008, Jacobson & Petrie, 2009). Risk-aversion has also 
been identified as a key feature preventing farmers from adopting new profitable technologies (e.g., Liu, 
2008, Dercon & Christiaensen, 2011). Studies of time preferences in developing countries also find a high 
level of impatience, which may prevent farmers from making long-term investments (Tanaka et al., 2010, 
Ashraf et al., 2006, Duflo et al., 2011).  
 
Recent research suggests that risk and time preferences may be related: individuals who are more risk-
tolerant may also be more patient (Anderhub et al., 2001, Burks et al., 2009, Dohmen et al., 2012, Carpenter 
et al., 2011, Benjamin et al., 2012). Precisely how they are related is still unclear, though some evidence 
suggests that they may share common genetic and behavioral roots. For instance, Carpenter et al. (2011) 
find that risk and time preferences are both related to the 7-repeat allele of the DRD4 gene that regulates 
dopamine uptake in the brain, while Dohmen et al. (2010) find that risk and time preferences both correlate 
with cognitive ability. Given these findings, as well as indirect evidence from lab experiments about the 
relationship between risk and time preferences provided by Halevy (2008), Epper et al. (2012), Andreoni 
and Sprenger (2012) and Bchir et al. (2013), field experiments are needed to shed light on their external 
validity. 
 
We contribute to this literature by delivering new field evidence about the relationship between risk and 
time preferences via a method specifically designed for field settings: a simplified version of the Convex 
Time Budget method (CTB hereafter) first introduced by Andreoni & Sprenger (2012) (AS hereafter). Such 
a method is needed for two reasons. First, while the available laboratory evidence suggests that risk and 
time preferences are correlated, field data remains sparse because of methodological challenges. The 
standard method for eliciting time preferences based on multiple price lists (MPLs) has been criticized 
because it forces subjects to choose extreme budget allocations, which may partly explain why these 
methods yield high estimated individual discount rates (Frederick et al., 2002). Indeed, according to 
Andreoni & Sprenger (2012): the “experimenters’ frequent assumption of linear utility … leads to upward-
biased discount rate estimates if utility is concave”. By contrast, the CTB exhibits several advantages 
relative to standard MPLs but requires some adjustments to be usable for field experiments. Second, almost 
all of the previous experimental studies were based on a specific combination of elicitation methods for 
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risk and time preferences. With the exception of Carpenter et al. (2011), risk preferences were elicited by 
certainty equivalents for risky lotteries and time preferences were elicited with multiple price lists. The 
method based on certainty equivalents has some well-known limitations, such as the propagation of errors. 
Depending on the nature of the subject pool it is sometimes preferable to rely on a single lottery choice task 
as proposed by Binswanger (1980) and Eckel & Grossman (2008), rather than on the standard iterative 
methods implemented for narrowing down the certainty equivalents.  
 
We develop and test a simplified version of the CTB, modified for implementation in a field setting, and 
illustrate its operation among farmers in rural Uganda. Our field-CTB restricts the set of feasible budget 
allocations between sooner and later payment dates to the options most frequently chosen when the standard 
CTB is implemented in the lab. Besides allowing for aggregate and individual estimates of subjective 
discount rates, the data generated by the field-CTB can also be used to estimate the curvature of the utility 
function. Therefore we can test directly the conjecture about the negative correlation between risk tolerance 
and impatience in individuals. We provide a robustness check for the existence of such a correlation by 
relying on a second and independent measure of risk preferences based on the method proposed by 
Binswanger (1980) and by Eckel & Grossman (2008), and which is particularly suitable for field 
experiments (Dave et al., 2010).  
 
Based on our experimental field data which was obtained through a combination of our field- CTB and the 
Binswanger methods, we find evidence of a negative correlation between risk-tolerance and impatience. 
Because our study uses an unconventional sample for which a WEIRD1 effect is unlikely, we increase both 
the robustness and the external validity of the alleged risk and time preference relationship.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents a brief overview of the literature, 
section 3 presents our experimental design, section 4 presents the results and section 5 concludes.  
 
1. Relationship between risk and time preferences 
 
Several recent experimental studies report a correlation between risk and time preferences (Anderhub et 
al., 2001, Carpenter et al., 2011, Dohmen et al., 2010, Burks et al., 2009). Albeit most find that risk-averse 
individuals are also more impatient, they also find that  risk-tolerance is highly variable among individuals 
and can depend on individual characteristics, including gender, age, education, health status, risk-exposure, 
and religion. In parallel, recent genetic studies have found that the propensity to take risks is partly heritable 
                                                        
1 Subjects from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich and Democratic countries (Henrich et al., 2010). 
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(Cesarini et al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2009). For instance, Carpenter et al. (2011) find that the propensity to 
choose risky lotteries is predicted by the presence of the 7 repeat allele of the dopamine receptor gene 
DRD4. They also find that the same allele predicts subjects’ choices in an MPL designed to elicit time 
preferences.  
 
In the experimental literature, Anderhub et al. (2001) elicit risk preferences by certainty equivalents for 
immediate lotteries and time preferences by certainty equivalents for delayed lottery. Similarly, Dohmen 
et al. (2009) rely on certainty equivalents for a lottery to elicit risk preferences and an MPL offering a series 
of choices between an immediate payment and a later payment. They find a strong negative correlation 
between individuals’ propensity to take risks and their impatience: individuals who are more patient are 
less risk-averse. Dohmen et al.’s (2009) study uses a large (n > 1000) representative sample of the German 
population, which provides field evidence of the relationship between risk and time preferences but a major 
drawback is that the key result is based on a between subject analysis: subjects are either assigned to the 
time preference task or to the risk preference task. Their results therefore preclude conclusion that risk and 
time preferences are correlated within individuals. In contrast, and to facilitate a within subject analysis, 
Burks et al. (2009) ask their subjects to perform both tasks. They estimate a quasi-hyperbolic () 
discounting model with the data of the time preferences task and a CRRA parameter with the data of the 
risk preference task. They report a negative correlation with the estimated risk-aversion parameter and each 
of the time preferences parameters. Nevertheless, their data was obtained from a highly specialized sample: 
US trainee truckers, thus limiting its external validity. Interestingly, both Dohmen et al. (2009) and Burks 
et al. (2009) show that risk and time preferences are correlated to cognitive ability; individuals with higher 
cognitive skills are more patient and more risk-tolerant.  
 
Additional methodological factors may explain the significance of previous findings related to risk and 
time preferences. Most importantly, all previous studies were based on standard MPLs to elicit time 
preferences, which are well known to overestimate discount rates (see Frederick et al., 2002, and Andersen 
et al., 2008). It is therefore important to test whether the relationship between risk and time preferences is 
robust to methodological factors, in particular to the way time preferences are elicited.  
 
     3. Experimental design 
 
3.1 Sample 
 
Risk and time preferences were elicited among subjects participating in a larger field experiment that 
examined the relationship between farmer preferences and their willingness to participate in an 
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environmental conservation program in Uganda.2 As such, our sample consists of farmers from Masindi 
District, western Uganda, where the program takes place (Figure 1). Farmers were recruited to participate 
in the experiment according to three criteria: land tenure, tribe, and language. The land tenure criterion 
ensured that participants had decision-making power over their land and thus could decide how to dedicate 
their land to farming and environmental conservation. Tribal affiliation and linguistics are important 
considerations because Uganda has 51 tribes and 31 languages, several of which are mutually unintelligible 
(Ladefoged, 1992). Within Masindi, we selected 13 villages in 5 sub-counties where ethnic Banyoro are 
the predominant tribal group and Runyoro is the most widely spoken language. 3 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3.1 Risk preferences 
 
Risk preferences were elicited using Eckel & Grossman’s Gamble-Choice task (EG thereafter) (2008). In 
this task, subjects choose between six gambles (Table 1). Each gamble carries a 0.50 probability of a low 
outcome and a 0.50 probability of a high outcome. Gamble 1 offers a safe option involving a certain return 
with no risk. Gambles 2 to 5 increase linearly in both expected return and risk. Gamble 6 offers the same 
expected return as Gamble 5, but with more risk. Subjects were ranked on a scale of 1 to 6 according to 
their selected gamble: subjects who select Gamble 1 are classified as extremely risk-averse; subjects who 
select Gamble 6 are classified as risk-seeking.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3.2 Time preferences 
 
Time preferences were elicited using a simplified version of AS’s CTB task, which we adapted for 
implementation in the field. In this task, subjects work through three forms, each with five questions, 
concerning payments over near- and long-term time frames. Each question presents a payoff vector (xt, xt+k) 
                                                        
2 See Clot & Stanton (2014). 
3 Banyoro are well represented in Kampala, Uganda’s capital, where many students are fluent in both Runyoro and English, 
which facilitated the coordination of focus groups to test and translate our experimental protocol. Our protocol was adapted 
using double blind translation. 
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that offers a payment xt at a sooner date t and a payment xt+k at a later date t+k. In the first form, t=1 day 
and k= 35 days; in the second form, t=1 day and k=70 days, and in the third form, t=36 days and k=35 days. 
For each of the 15 questions, subjects choose between three payoff vectors corresponding either to an 
extreme allocation of a fixed budget at date t or date t+k, or to an interior allocation corresponding to an 
equal split of the fixed budget. A price ratio P measures the relative price of “consumption” at the sooner 
date: P = 1+ r, where r is the gross interest rate. Figure 2 presents a sample CTB form and Table 2 presents 
summary information of the 15 allocation questions. The sequence of questions is designed so that 
participants would initially choose the payoff vector (xt,0) and eventually switch to (0, xt+k), thereby 
revealing information about the curvature of their utility function. Following AS, varying the price ratio P 
allows estimation of the utility function curvature (), varying k allows estimation of the discount factor 
(), and varying t allows estimation of present bias (β). 
 
As in other field implementations of the CTB (Giné et al. (2012), Carvalho et al. (2013), Janssen et al. 
(2013), Clot and Stanton (2014), Sawada and Kuroishi (2015), we needed to adapt its original design to our 
field setting. In our experiment we introduced two important changes: first, we eliminated the intermediary 
budget allocation decision, instead requiring that subjects choose an inter-temporal payoff vector4 directly. 
Second, we restricted the set of possible budget allocations from which subjects can choose. Critically, our 
restricted set of budget allocations contains the most frequently observed allocations in AS’s unconstrained 
set (2012)5. Indeed, AS found that 37% of their subjects always choose extreme allocations, with the 
remaining subjects choose such extreme allocations only 50% of the time on average.6  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
3.3 Data 
 
We collected data on 282 individuals across 13 villages. We conducted one experimental session per 
village. Each session involved between 20 and 24 subjects. Subjects were told that the study would take 4 
hours and that they would earn approximately UGX 3500 (USD 1.35) plus a UGX 1500 thank-you 
payment, the average equivalent of two day’s wages in rural Uganda.  
                                                        
4 Our setting is nevertheless very close to AS because in their experiment subjects could directly see the final payoff vector 
corresponding to any allocation.  
5 Our choice set contrasts with Carvalho et al.’s (2013) who only allow for interior allocations.  
6 AS also found that subjects who choose interior allocations frequently select allocations that are close or equal to the mid-
point. 
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INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
Subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics were collected in a post-experiment survey. Table 3 reports 
summary statistics for the control variables used in our statistical analysis of the relationship between risk 
and time preferences. The average individual is 42 years old, has completed primary school, owns 10 
hectares of land and lives less than one kilometer from a paved road. Men constitute 78% of the sample. 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
2. Results 
We present our key findings in two subsections. Subsection 4.1 compares our field data to AS’s data. There 
are two important differences between these data: first our data was generated by a highly simplified version 
of the CTB task, adapted to the field and second, in contrast to AS who run a controlled laboratory 
experiment with US students, our data was collected through a framed field experiment involving a 
heterogeneous subject pool of farmers in rural Uganda. Subsection 4.2 examines the within-subject 
relationship between risk and time preferences in two ways: (i) by investigating the correlation between the 
estimated parameters for risk tolerance and for patience based on the field-CTB data only, and (ii) by 
analyzing the correlation between a subject’s risk preference category elicited with the EG method and time 
preferences elicited by the field- CTB task. For notational convenience we write xt,+k the amount of the 
sooner payment at date t, when the delay for the later payment equals k.  
4.1 Laboratory versus field CTB data  
We estimate individual parameters for approximately 72% of the subject pool (203 out of 282 individuals)7. 
Parameters are estimated as in Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) by assuming that an individual’s preferences 
over experimental payoff vectors (xt, xt+k) are represented by a CRRA utility function combined with quasi-
hyperbolic discounting (Laibson 1997, O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999).  
                                                        
7 AS (2012) provide estimates for 88% of their subjects (86 out of 97). 
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                      𝑢(𝑥𝑡 , 𝑥𝑡+𝑘) =  {
𝑥𝑡
𝛼 + 𝛽𝛿𝑘𝑥𝑡+𝑘
𝛼     𝑖𝑓 𝑡 = 0
𝑥𝑡
𝛼 + 𝛿𝑘𝑥𝑡+𝑘
𝛼       𝑖𝑓 𝑡 > 0
                               
 (1) 
 
The payoff vector that maximizes u(xt , xt+k) under the future value budget constraint Pxt + xt+k = B satisfies 
the first-order condition (for an interior solution) given by equation (2).   
 
                                             𝑃 =
𝑥𝑡
𝛼−1
𝛼𝛽𝛿𝑘𝑥𝑡+𝑘
𝛼−1   (2) 
 
Rearranging and taking logarithm, we can rewrite the first-order condition as: 
                                                𝑙𝑛 (
𝑥𝑡
𝑥𝑡+𝑘
) =  
𝑙𝑛(𝛽)
𝛼−1
+
𝑘𝑙𝑛(𝛿)
𝛼−1
+
ln (𝑃)
𝛼−1
  (3) 
  
We rely on non-linear least squares in order to estimate . Increasing the gross interest rate r, all else 
equal, allows estimation of a subject’s CRRA parameter  from his (xt ,xt+k) choices. Note that  also 
measures the curvature of the utility function. In a similar way we can estimate an individual’s discount 
rate , by varying the delay k, all else equal. Finally, present bias  is estimated by comparing the choice 
(xt ,xt+k) when t > 0 to the choice (xt ,xt+k)  when t = 0, all else equal. Strictly speaking, the elicitation of 
present bias requires an immediate cash payment because “present bias is a visceral response only activated 
when sooner rewards are actually immediate” (AS, 2012). However, for practical reasons such immediacy 
is not always feasible. For instance, in AS (2012), the payments are made several hours after a session in 
order to “equate transactions costs over sooner and later payments”.  For the same reason, we needed to 
include a front-end delay of one day in our experimental setting. By neutralizing transaction costs however, 
present bias may become undetectable8. 
 
For 79 of our subjects we could not provide meaningful parameters estimates because 76 subjects chose 
“flat9” or “quasi-flat10” allocation decisions and 3 subjects reported inconsistent answers11. The upper panel 
                                                        
8 We refer to see AS (2012) for a thorough discussion about this issue. 
 
9 No variations in participants’ decisions over the 15 CTB choice sets.  
10 No variations in participants’ decisions over the 10 first CTB choice sets. 
11 Willing to wait longer for a smaller amount of money. 
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of Table 4 summarizes the estimates of the preference parameters for the 203 usable observations (Field 
data in Table 4). For comparison purposes the lower panel reports the AS estimates (AS data in Table 4). 
Figures 3 - 6 provide histograms of individual parameters for the two samples.  
 
 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The histograms reveal both similarities and differences between our field data and AS’s lab data. Similar 
to AS, the majority of our subjects exhibit low discount rates, limited present bias and moderate utility 
function curvature. Both  and  are mostly distributed around value 1. The median curvature estimate is 
 = 0.949 (Table 2), which is closer to the median curvature estimate of AS than estimates reported in other 
papers (e.g., Andersen et al., 2008 found CRRA estimates below 0.5). The median time inconsistency 
parameter  equals 1, which is also close to AS’s estimate. Further consistent with their findings, the null 
hypothesis of the absence of present bias ( = 1) cannot be rejected (t-test, p = 0.000) for our sample. More 
specifically, 36.45% of the subjects in our sample are categorized as ‘time consistent’. Subjects are time 
consistent when they choose the same payoff for t = 1 and k = 35 (x1,35
 ) as for t = 35 and k=35 (i.e., x1,35
 = 
x35,35). Among the remaining 63.55% time-inconsistent subjects, 36.45% are present-biased (i.e. x1,35 > 
x35,35, “impatient now and patient later”) and 27.09% are future-biased (i.e. x1,35 < x35,35, “patient now and 
impatient later”). In contrast to AS, however, our sample contains more time inconsistent individuals (x1,35 
≠ x35,35). In the AS sample 16.7% of the subjects are present-biased and 10.7% are future-biased. In this 
way, our results are similar to those of Ashraf et al. (2006), who observe about 35% of present-biased 
subjects and 19.8% of future-biased subjects in their Philippines sample. Another difference with AS is the 
large proportion of subjects who exhibit negative discount rates (88.7%) in our sample. We believe these 
subjects may be imposing a savings constraint on themselves by choosing to delay immediate consumption 
in favor of future consumption. In short, the comparison of our field data to the AS data reveals important 
similarities, including parameter estimates of  and , but also differences: a larger proportion of future-
biased subjects and a very high proportion of subjects with negative discount rates. These two 
characteristics might be specific to our field context. However, an alternative interpretation is that students’ 
preferences differ from those of field subjects, as suggested by the similarities of our findings with those 
of Ashraf et al. (2006).  
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INSERT FIGURES 3-6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
4.2 Correlation between risk and time preferences  
In order to study the relationship between risk and time preferences we execute two independent analyses. 
First, we look for a correlation within subjects between their risk preferences, elicited with the EG task, 
and their time preference parameter , elicited with the field-CTB task. Second we study the correlation 
between the CRRA parameter estimates ( and the time preference parameter estimate . 
 
4.2.1 Correlation between risk preferences categories and the time preference parameter 
The EG method allows us to categorize each subject as more or less risk-averse on a scale from 1 to 6 
according to their selected gamble, where 1 corresponds to the most risk-averse category and 6 to the most 
risk-seeking. Table 5 shows the frequency of subjects in each category.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Before providing statistical support for the relationship between risk and time preferences based on our six 
risk-categories, we first give a graphical representation of this relationship based on a coarse categorization 
of subjects as follows: subjects who selected gamble 1 are classified as risk-averse, those who selected 
gambles 2 to 5 are classified as risk-neutral, and those who selected gamble 6 are classified as risk-seekers. 
As illustrated in Figure 7, risk-seekers are the most patient. The mean amount chosen for the earlier date is 
significantly lower for risk-seekers than for other risk-categories both for x1,35
 (Student t-test; t=1.6464, 
p=0.0999) as well as for x36,35 (Student t-test; t=2.0787, p=0.0378). Figure 7 shows that our data is overall 
consistent with the hypothesis that risk tolerant individuals are also more patient, which aligns with 
previous findings (Anderhub et al., 2001, Carpenter et al., 2011, Dohmen et al., 2010, Burks et al., 2009). 
However, there is no difference when the delay is relatively long (k = 70) as illustrated by the case x1,70. 
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INSERT FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
 
INSERT FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Interestingly, Figure 8 shows that risk-seekers and risk-neutral individuals tend to be time-consistent (x1,35 
vs. x35,35) while risk-averse subjects tend to be time-inconsistent. More specifically, risk-averse subjects are 
more likely to be future-biased than other subject-types. For t=1 day they choose a lower amount than for 
t=35 days. Risk-seekers seem to be sensitive to an increase in the delay k (all other things equal): they are 
less patient for higher values of k. They allocate lower amounts to the sooner date for k=35 days than for 
k=70 days. Interestingly, other risk categories are less sensitive to this parameter.  
 
Tables 6 and 7 provide statistical support for the visual evidence reported in Figures 7 and 8. Table 6 
summarizes the estimates of ordered probit regressions with the risk-preference category (coded 1 to 6, 
where 6 is the highest risk-tolerance category) as the dependent variable. The regressions support our 
conjecture about a negative correlation between risk and time preferences:  affects negatively the 
probability that a subject belongs to a higher risk-tolerance category. The relationship between and the 
risk preference category remains robust after controlling for various factors, including demographic 
variables (e.g., gender, age, education, etc.) and financial variables (e.g., savings, outstanding loans, etc.).  
 
We observe that the size of land ownership positively affects risk taking while age negative affects risk 
taking. Land ownership and cattle size are often good proxies for wealth in developing countries (Wik et 
al., 2004). For instance, individuals who own more land appear to be less risk averse, which is similar to 
decreasing risk-aversion with wealth. Our results about risk aversion confirm the results of other field 
experiments that rejected the hypothesis of constant relative risk aversion in favor of decreasing or 
increasing relative risk-aversion (e.g. Binswanger, 1981, Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009)12. Larger land 
                                                        
12 Our data, as well as the data of the cited papers, however do not allow for a direct test of CRRA, IRRA or DRRA. In 
contrast, the data of Holt & Laury (2002) which includes subjects” choices for different payoff scales provides the possibility 
of such a direct test. Their evidence, for US student subjects, is in favor of IRRA. 
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ownership increases the propensity to take risk as previously observed (Donkers et al., 2001; Hartog et al., 
2002, Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009). However, other studies found no correlation between risk-aversion and 
wealth (see e.g. Cardenas and Carpenter, 2013). We also observe that risk aversion increases with age, as 
in Tanaka et al. (2010). It is often found that education and gender significantly affect risk preferences (e.g., 
Tanaka et al., 2010, Croson and Gneezy, 2009). However, in our sample, which is mainly composed of 
educated men (for the purpose of testing the field -CTB task), we cannot study these variables.  
 
4.2.2 Correlation between the parameter estimates of the CTB task 
Table 7 summarizes the results of linear regressions between preference parameter estimates derived from 
the field-CTB task. The dependent variable is the curvature parameter a that accounts for relative risk 
aversion and the key explanatory variable is the time preference parameter . The regressions support our 
conjecture about a negative correlation between risk and time preferences:  negatively affects . Note that 
 is insignificant which is consistent with our previous result about the absence of present bias in our 
sample. The relationship between  and the risk preference category is robust after controlling for 
demographic and financial variables. In the complete regression model, which includes all the control 
variables, the relationship between  and  is highly significant. This result leads us to conclude that the 
negative correlation between impatience and the propensity to take risk is robust to multiple factors in our 
sample.  
 
3. Concluding remarks  
 
We designed a simplified field version of the CTB task to investigate the relationship between risk and time 
preferences in farmers participating in an environmental conservation program in Uganda. Compared to 
other elicitation strategies, which rely on a combination of tasks, the CTB task uniquely elicits both 
subjective discount factors and utility curvatures through a single experimental protocol. Notwithstanding 
our simplification of AS’s original CTB method and our application to non-student subjects in a field 
setting, many of our findings are consistent with those of AS. Remaining differences, such as the higher 
frequency of time-inconsistent answers in our sample, are likely attributable to the nature of the subject 
pool since our sample has a lower level of education compared to the AS sample.  
Using our field-CTB task, we find a negative correlation between time preferences and risk preferences: 
the more risk averse subjects discount more heavily delayed payments. This statement is established on 
two independent measures of risk tolerance: the risk aversion coefficient estimated from the CTB data, and 
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the risk aversion category elicited with the EG method. The conclusion is therefore robust to the elicitation 
task as well as robust to several controls.   
This key finding – that impatience and risk taking are negatively correlated – has two important 
implications. First, it provides new support for the previously documented relationship between risk and 
time preferences (Anderhub et al., 2001, Carpenter et al., 2011, Dohmen et al., 2010, Burks et al., 2009). 
This finding is robust both to a change in the elicitation method and to the field setting of a developing 
country context. Second, it reveals two facets of preferences that are important for designing efficient 
incentives to adopt conservation programs. Impatient, risk-averse individuals may favor investing in fast-
growing crops that generate immediate cash compared to enrolling in long-term conservation contracts. 
Also, because of their collective dimension, conservation programs involve both the risk of short-term 
failure when potential participants expect a lack of involvement and the risk of a long-term benefit in case 
of success, but which is essentially collective. Therefore, impatient, risk-averse individuals may be reluctant 
to enroll for two reasons. Taking into account both the specificity of the relationship between impatience 
and risk aversion and the heterogeneity of preferences can provide new insights for designing more efficient 
incentives to enroll reluctant farmers into conservation programs and more generally, to involve individuals 
into targeted programs13.  
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TABLES 
 
Table 1: Gamble-Choices task for measuring risk preferences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Experimental Parameters for Convex Time Budget (CTB) task 
 
Decision 
t (sooner 
date) 
k 
(delay) 
P (Price 
ratios) 
Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 
at at+k at at+k at at+k 
1 1 35 1.00 4000 0 2000 2000 0 4000 
2 1 35 1.05 3800 0 1900 2000 0 4000 
3 1 35 1.11 3600 0 1800 2000 0 4000 
4 1 35 1.25 3200 0 1600 2000 0 4000 
5 1 35 1.43 2800 0 1400 2000 0 4000 
6 1 70 1.00 4000 0 2000 2000 0 4000 
7 1 70 1.05 3800 0 1900 2000 0 4000 
8 1 70 1.11 3600 0 1800 2000 0 4000 
9 1 70 1.25 3200 0 1600 2000 0 4000 
10 1 70 1.43 2800 0 1400 2000 0 4000 
11 36 35 1.00 4000 0 2000 2000 0 4000 
12 36 35 1.05 3800 0 1900 2000 0 4000 
13 36 35 1.11 3600 0 1800 2000 0 4000 
14 36 35 1.25 3200 0 1600 2000 0 4000 
15 36 35 1.43 2800 0 1400 2000 0 4000 
 
 
 
  
                                                        
14 Preferences follow a Constant Relative Risk Aversion functional form, this is calculated as the range of ‘r’ in the function 
U=x(1-r)/(1-r) for which each gamble is the utility-maximizing choice. (Eckel & Grossman, 2007) 
Gamble 
Low 
Payoff 
High 
Payoff 
Expected 
value 
SD 
Implied CRRA14 
Range 
Risk status 
1 2800 2800 2800 0 3.46<r Extremely risk-averse 
2 2400 3600 3000 600 1.16< r <3.46 Strongly risk-averse 
3 2000 4400 3200 1200 0.71< r <1.16 Risk-averse 
4 1600 5200 3400 1800 0.50< r <0.71 Slightly risk-averse 
5 1200 6000 3600 2400 0< r <0.50 Risk neutral 
6 200 7000 3600 3400 r <0 Risk seeker 
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Table 3:  Summary Statistics 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. †Education is coded as: primary level (=0), secondary level and above (=1). ††Difficulty Acquiring Money is coded as: easy (=0), difficult (=1). 
Village 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 All sample 
N 19 22 21 22 20 23 22 23 23 20 24 23 21 283 
Age 
52.526 41.636 41,00 40.318 40.25 40.739 45.773 48.391 36.045 37.85 48.042 35.348 41.333 42.22 
(3.2) (3.167) (2.77) (2.59) (2.59) (3.445) (2.859) (3.425) (2.364) (1.952) (2.676) (2.274) (3.909) (0.844) 
Gender (Male=1) 
1 0.773 0.857 0.727 0.7 0.826 0.955 0.696 0.818 0.75 0.833 0.826 0.571 0.792 
(0) (0.091) (0.078) (0.097) (0.105) (0.081) (0.045) (0.098) (0.084) (0.099) (0.078) (0.081) (0.111) (0.024) 
Education † 
0.263 0.5 0.619 0.454 0.55 0.347 0.318 0.478 0.695 0.4 0.416 0.478 0.571 0.468 
(0.103) (0.109) (0.108) (0.108) (0.114) (0.101) (0.101) (0.106) (0.098) (0.112) (0.102) (0.106) (0.110) (0.029) 
Land Area 
(Hectares) 
23.444 14,00 13.25 10.813 4.425 7.429 8.024 5.87 5.262 4.363 6.083 8.522 16.881 9.655 
(10.315) (5.589) (3.722) (2.933) (0.58) (1.963) (1.27) (0.77) (0.907) (0.648) (1.584) (1.635) (12.178) (1.325) 
Income 
23632.22 45170.47 28994.06 24742.05 73166.67 112934.8 50071.43 86188.41 70839.88 23708.33 36676.58 32206.15 42609.65 61799.17 
(7963.59) (13449.87) (5357.876) (5995.235) (12034.7) (32264.28) (9352.197) (31434.8) (23026.34) (4779.298) (6653.92) (11022.58) (17607.29) (13678.41) 
Household size 
6.789 6.5 6.143 3.5 7.3 5.261 7.00 8.174 6.455 5.55 6.917 5.87 6.286 6.287 
(0.691) (0.573) (0.641) (3.89) (0.785) (0.531) (0.868) (1.032) (0.695) (0.489) (0.932) (0.837) (0.793) (0.363) 
Distance to 
market (Km) 
2.516 3.75 2.643 0.98 3.205 5.122 2.414 3.326 4.518 1.181 2.85 7.413 4.838 3.483 
(0.424) (0.492) (0.356) (0.235) (0.475) (0.697) (0.349) (0.275) (0.533) (0.268) (0.362) (0.705) (0.482) (0.160) 
Distance to paved 
road (Km) 
1.708 0.377 0.615 0.31 0.58 2.16 0.646 0.352 0.855 0.504 0.454 1.438 0.959 0.840 
(0.797) (0.075) (0.106) (0.091) (0.175) (0.997) (0.131) (0.09) (0.253) (0.117) (0.131) (0.337) (0.251) (0.110) 
Difficulty 
acquiring money†† 
0.578 0.181 0.523 0.5 0.45 0.260 0.136 0.434 0.347 0.35 0.291 0.173 0.428 0.352 
(0.116) (0.084) (0.111) (0.109) (0.114) (0.093) (0.074) (0.105) (0.101) (0.109) (0.094) (0.080) (0.110) (0.028) 
Outstanding loans 
(=1) 
0.263 0.545 0.19 0.318 0.55 0.217 0.5 0.174 0.409 0.55 0.292 0.652 0.286 0.379 
(0.104) (0.109) (0.088) (0.102) (0.114) (0.088) (0.109) (0.081) (0.107) (0.114) (0.095) (0.102) (0.101) (0.028) 
Savings (=1) 
0.526 0.727 0.286 0.409 0.6 0.478 0.864 0.478 0.636 0.85 0.625 0.739 0.619 (0.602) 
(0.118) (0.097) (0.101) (0.107) (0.112) (0.106) (0.075) (0.106) (0.105) (0.082) (0.101) (0.094) (0.109) (0.029) 
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Table 4: Individual Parameter Estimates  
 
Parameter  N  Median  5th 
percentile 
 95th 
percentile 
Field data         
  203  0.949  -0.005  0.975 
  203  1  0.334  1.932 
  203  1.004  0.991  1.031 
r  203  -0.771  -0.999  22.58 
AS data (AS, 2012)         
  86  0.9665  0.7076  0.9997 
  86  1.0011  0.9121  1.1075 
  86  0.9991  0.9948  1.0005 
r  86  0.4076  -0.1784  5.618 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Frequency distribution of subjects in the risk task 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
15 Preferences follow a Constant Relative Risk Aversion functional form, this is calculated as the range of ‘r’ 
in the function U=x(1-r)/(1-r) for which each gamble is the utility-maximizing choice. (Eckel & Grossman, 
2007) 
Gamble 
Implied CRRA15 
Range 
Risk status 
Fraction of 
Subjects 
(%) 
1 3.46<r Extremely risk-averse 16.25 
2 1.16< r <3.46 Strongly risk-averse 16.61 
3 0.71< r <1.16 Risk-averse 19.79 
4 0.50< r <0.71 Slightly risk-averse 9.19 
5 0< r <0.50 Risk Neutral 11.31 
6 r <0 Risk Seeker 26.86 
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Table 6: Ordered Probit Regressions (dependent variable is risk category) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: OLS Regression (dependent variable is  
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Location of Masindi district, Uganda 
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Figure 2:  Sample Convex Time Budget Decision Form  
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Figure 3a - Estimated Annual Discount Rates  
(Uganda sample)  
Figure 3b - Estimated Annual Discount Rates  
(AS 2012 sample) 
   
Figure 4a - Estimated Daily Discount Factor (delta) 
(Uganda sample)  
Figure 4b - Estimated Daily Discount Factor (delta) 
(AS 2012 sample) 
   
Figure 5a - Estimated Present Bias (beta) 
(Uganda sample)  
Figure 5b - Estimated Present Bias (beta) 
(AS 2012 sample) 
   
Figure 6a - Estimated Curvature Parameter (alpha) 
(Uganda sample)  
 
 
Figure 6b - Estimated Curvature Parameter (alpha) 
(AS 2012 sample) 
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Figure 7: Mean Experimental Responses Over Time by Delay k and Sooner Payment t 
 
   
 
 
 
Figure 8 – Mean Experimental Responses Over Time by Risk Profile 
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